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One of the features that make humans different from all other animal species 
is their capacity to enter normative relationships with their conspecifics. 
Plausibly, this capacity is strictly related to the human ability to cooperate 
which, according to Tomasello (2014), evolved in two steps: in a first phase 
humans developed joint intentionality, which supports the small-scale 
collaborative activities typical of hunter-gatherer groups; then in a second 
phase humans became capable of collective intentionality, on which the 
large-scale normativity of social institutions is grounded. Tomasello argues 
that the psychological infrastructure for joint intentionality includes skills and 
motivations that allow social partners to collaborate in a second-personal 
mode by maintaining a common ground of shared knowledge and 
coordinating toward the achievement of common goals; in contrast, collective 
intentionality involves the ability to recognise, follow and enforce a system 
of agent-generic social norms able to regulate large-scale cooperative 
activities. 
In Tomasello’s view the joint intentionality supporting small-scale 
collaboration is not essentially normative. This opens up the problem of how 
the psychological infrastructure for large-scale normativity may have evolved 
from non-normative joint intentionality. Tomasello and Vaish (2013) 
postulate an intermediate phase of small-scale normativity, in which 
 NeaScience N°9 – Anno 2                                               42 
 
“individuals ... felt answerable to others (as others were answerable to them) 
for being a good partner” (p. 239). However, Tomasello and Vaish do not 
analyse what is involved in feeling answerable, nor investigate the relation 
between small-scale normativity and group-level norms. 
Recently we have suggested that small-scale normativity can be analysed 
in terms of interpersonal responsibility (Carassa & Colombetti, 2014, 2015). 
That A is responsible to B to do X means that A and B have special positions 
toward A’s doing or not doing X; in particular if A does not do X, B has the 
stand to complain, A is expected to provide a reasonable excuse, and so on. 
Normative relationships are a piece of social reality, and as such they hold if, 
and only if, they are recognised to hold by a suitable social collective (the 
source of the normativity). A characteristic feature of interpersonal 
responsibility is that its source coincides with the agents who are related by 
the responsibility; everyday examples of interpersonal responsibilities are 
those deriving from promises, agreements, and the like. 
In another article (Carassa & Colombetti, 2012) we have argued that 
normativity presupposes a psychological infrastructure which goes beyond 
the ordinary toolkit of mainstream cognitive science, because being 
responsible to someone is not (at least, not only) a matter of holding 
epistemic or volitional mental states, like beliefs, desires or intentions. In our 
previous works, however, we did not describe a possible psychological 
infrastructure of responsibility, nor clarify whether a single infrastructure 
may support both small-scale and large-scale normativity. The aim of the 
current presentation is to deal with these crucial issues. More specifically we 
want to defend two theses: (i), that the psychological infrastructure allowing 
people to enter relationships of responsibility is rooted in human affectivity, 
and in particular in certain types of emotions; and (ii), that different aspects 
of responsibility, and therefore different types of emotions, are involved in 
small-scale and large-scale normativity. 
The thesis that normativity is rooted in emotions has been extensively 
discussed in such fields as moral psychology (e.g., by Haidt, 2003) and moral 
philosophy (see Nichols, 2004, and Prinz, 2007, for two fairly radical 
positions on the matter). Our contribution is not aimed at presenting evidence 
for such a thesis, but rather at investigating what an emotion-based theory 
may contribute to an understanding of normativity. 
As far as small-scale normativity is concerned, one can speculate that 
interpersonal responsibility started to evolve in the context of joint activities 
driven by shared goals and carried out in situations in which every participant 
could directly monitor the contribution of all partners. Plausibly, humans 
evolved specific emotions to deal effectively with this type of activities: 
certain other-condemning emotions, like anger, and self-conscious emotions, 
like shame and guilt (Haidt, 2003) are clearly related to the management of 
failures and defections, either a partner’s or one’s own. These emotions are 
social, in the sense that their function is to regulate the interaction with other 
agents, and intersubjective, in the sense that to fulfil their functions they need 
to be perceived by one’s partners; thus we can assume that they evolved 
together with the intersubjective capacities that make it possible to share 
them with the relevant others (Morganti, Carassa, & Riva, 2008). 
We submit that the ability to entertain such social emotions constitutes 
the psychological infrastructure of a sense of being responsible or answerable 
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to one’s partners in the context of joint activities. We also suggest that this 
infrastructure has been co-opted (i.e., specialised for a new function, Fessler 
& Gervais, 2010) to support forms of interpersonal cooperation that go 
beyond hic-et-nunc collaboration, thus making room for contributions that 
are either distanced (I do this here, you do that over there) or delayed (I do 
this now, you will do that later). This form of second-person answerability for 
locally and temporally displaced activities is what interpersonal responsibility 
amounts to. 
One can wonder how interpersonal normativity may have evolved into 
the type of normativity that constitutes large-scale cultural institutions. As a 
start, let us remark that also social norms, although they are agent-generic (in 
the sense that they apply to all agents who instantiate certain properties), 
impose responsibilities to agents: for example, we hold a person responsible 
to take care of their parents not because they made an agreement to this 
effect, but just because they instantiate a child-parent relationship. The main 
difference between interpersonal responsibilities and the responsibilities 
deriving from social norms is that the source of the latter is not in the same 
agents who are related by the responsibility, but is somewhat external. This 
means that social norms involve two distinct types of answerability: to one’s 
partners in a relationship of responsibility, and to the source of such 
relationship. Coherently with our hypothesis that responsibility is rooted in 
human affectivity, we argue that humans have developed specific social 
emotions also concerning the recognition of the source of social normativity: 
emotions of this kind have been discussed for example by Haidt (2003), as 
pertaining to the moral dimensions of loyalty and respect, and by Fessler and 
Haley (2003). 
However, the sheer recognition of the source of normativity is 
insufficient to support group-level norms, in particular because some 
effective sanctioning mechanism is required to deter free riding. What is 
needed in addition is the capacity to take a third-person stance that allows 
one to act as a representative of the source of normativity (an “intuitive 
prosecutor,” in the terminology of Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). We believe that 
also this capacity is rooted in human affectivity, more specifically in those 
“vicarious emotions” that allow agents to have emotional reactions to 
violations of normative relationships holding between others. 
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